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Abstract: Education has long been used as a tool for national identity formation and 
social cohesion. However, in diverse communities across the globe, the question must be 
asked: are educational institutions creating citizens with a narrow view of “us vs. them” 
or an identity built on multiculturalism and acceptance? Through past research, it is 
obvious that education has either acted as an instigator or mitigator of civil conflict, 
though to what extent is still largely unknown. In this thesis, I argue that both the extent 
and quality of education in a country can instigate or, at least, exacerbate the outbreak of 
civil conflict. To prove this hypothesis, I will highlight two educational factors as 
causally connected to civil conflict: educational access and educational content. First, 
educational access can affect civil conflict since a lack of educational and, in effect, 
economic opportunities may lead to rebel recruitment of a country’s youth. Second, 
educational content can affect civil conflict, as the language, images, and facts utilized in 
schools’ curricula may stir up ethnic and religious divides and hatred. In conclusion, 
though educational access is certainly connected to civil conflict, the results are varied, 
thus necessitating the need to dig deeper into the curricula of countries affected by civil 
conflict. These factors will help to pinpoint problem areas in the educational systems of 
countries dangerously close to civil conflict, as well as how to reshape educational 
policies for the future. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 For my thesis, I will focus on the role of education as either an instigator or 
mitigator of civil conflict. On the one hand, education has been used to assuage civil 
conflict by fostering a citizenship that values tolerance for other religions and ethnicities, 
as well as non-violent political participation. On the other hand, education has been 
equally used to indoctrinate its citizens with ethnic hatred, fear, and a militant nationalism 
that breeds civil conflict. This topic is personally intriguing to me because for the past 
seven years, I have been involved in international education in a variety of roles — both 
as a teacher and as an administrator. Although I have never taught in a country 
undergoing civil conflict, I have personally seen how a closed-minded, intolerant 
educational system can affect students’ outlook towards their country and “the other.” I 
taught business English in the international business department at a Chinese university 
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for three years, and I was shocked to see an educational system that lacked critical 
thinking, heralded an unquestioning acceptance of what was being taught, dissuaded 
classroom participation or differing opinions, and promoted a nationalism that demonized 
other Asian cultures and minorities within China. In my role as a teacher there and in my 
current role as a program manager at an international school, I have seen how education 
is one of the most influential factors in a person’s life, identity, and worldview, and it 
absolutely affects how that person views and treats “the other.” In this regard, I believe 
that education should play a key role in international development, especially in countries 
ravaged by civil conflict. It is important to note that for my thesis, education will be 
defined as the vehicle by which systematic instruction is given to mass populations via 
the state or religious institutions. An educational system must first and foremost prepare 
trained citizens, who can enter the workforce as contributors to society; however, what is 
often lost within that description is the key role education plays in fostering a stable 
society based on peace, tolerance, non-violent political participation, civic values, and an 
acceptance of a variety of viewpoints. Too often, educational systems fail in this regard 
by breeding ethnic dissension through biased curricular content or unequal access; by 
dissuading critical thinking, so that citizens will not question government decisions; or by 
simply not providing sufficient educational and, therefore, economic opportunities. 
Furthermore, civil conflict will be defined as a war or internal struggle between two or 
more organized groups within the state. 
 From the research that I have done on this topic, it appears that the majority of 
past articles have been highly policy-oriented, focusing largely on the task of post-
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conflict educational reconstruction. In The Hidden Crisis, UNESCO’s Education For All 
(EFA) Director Kevin Watkins states, “The role of education in contributing to the 
conditions for armed conflict has received little systematic attention on the part of 
governments and aid donors.”  Therefore, more research needs to be done from a 1
theoretical standpoint of why education might instigate or mitigate civil conflict. In 
addition, though there have been several studies done on the “quantity” of education 
(enrollment statistics), there have been relatively few studies done on the “quality” of 
education (curricular content), which is where I intend to focus my research.  Thus, a few 2
unanswered questions emerge in this field: (1) what are the effects of curricular content 
on civil conflict instigation or resumption? (2) Are there commonalities that can be traced 
cross-regionally or internationally in terms of a biased curricula? (3) When examining 
curricular content, what are the most important factors as they relate to ethnic or religious 
divisions? (4) Do educational factors play a primary role in instigating civil conflict, or 
are they merely used by the state to exacerbate already-present divisions and tensions? 
 For my thesis, I argue that both the extent and quality of education in a country 
can instigate or exacerbate the outbreak of civil conflict. To prove this hypothesis, I will 
highlight two causal factors as instigators of civil conflict: educational access and 
educational content. First, educational access highlights what effects poor enrollment 
 Kevin Watkins, Director of the EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2011, The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and 1
Education (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2011), 160.
 See Gudrun Ostby and Henrik Urdal, “Education and Civil Conflict: A Review of the Quantitative,   2
Empirical Literature,” UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report (2010): 24; Cf. Mohammad Zulfan 
Tadjoeddin and Syed Mansoob Murshed, “Socio-Economic Determinants of Everyday Violence in Indonesia: An 
Empirical Investigation of Javanese Districts, 1994-2003,” Journal of Peace Research vol. 44, no. 6 (November 2007): 
705; Cf. Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal, “Breaking the Waves? Does Education Mediate the Relationship Between 
Youth Bulges and Political Violence?” The World Bank Africa Region: Post Conflict and Social Development Unit 
(November 2009): 24; Cf. John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, “Educational Access and Peace Duration in Post-
Conflict Countries,” International Interactions vol. 38, no. 1 (2012): 74.
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rates and unequal access to education based on ethnicity or gender have on civil conflict. 
Second, educational content analyzes the language and images utilized in schools’ 
curricula in order to pinpoint where ethnic and religious divides are promoted. For 
example, the way a state teaches its history frequently manipulates ethnicity and plays on 
an “us vs. them” mentality. The effects of these factors will help to pinpoint problem 
areas in the educational systems of countries dangerously close to civil conflict, as well 
as how to reshape educational policies and infrastructure for the future. 
 This study will utilize both quantitative and qualitative analyses to focus 
specifically on the civil conflict case studies of Sudan, Kosovo, and Pakistan, as well as 
the contrasting case of Canada. The reasons for choosing case studies in Sudan, Kosovo, 
and Pakistan are because of prior field work done there, the fact that I was able to gain 
access to portions of their curricula, the large-scale nature of their civil conflict atrocities, 
and for their regional diversity. Canada was chosen as the contrasting case study because 
of its low-level of conflict, coupled with its high-level of diversity. In terms of 
quantitative analysis, my study will utilize the PRIO/Uppsala conflict dataset and the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (ILASA) educational dataset, as 
applied in the seminal studies performed by Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal in “Breaking 
the Waves?” and Clayton Thyne in “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule.”  The first part 3
of my research will attempt to discover a causal connection between a country’s level and 
access to education in relation to civil conflict probability. However, in order to dig 
 See Barakat and Urdal, “Breaking the Waves?”; Cf. Clayton Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s and the Golden Rule: The 3
Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999,” International Studies Quarterly vol. 50, no. 4 (December 
2006).
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deeper into the correlation between educational factors and civil conflict onset, the 
majority of my research will focus on a qualitative analyses of curricular content, as well 
as data from prior fieldwork and interview transcripts. From this past research and a fresh 
look at various curricula, I hope to glean information on the quality of the education 
systems in Sudan, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Canada. When analyzing these curricula, this 
study seeks to identify what biases a country might instill in its students regarding its 
history, any language patterns or images that might be used to further divide ethnic and 
religious groups, and whether or not civic values and behavior are stressed through 
participation and discussion of a variety of viewpoints in the classroom setting. 
 I hope this research will help to convince governments to incorporate these 
findings into their educational systems. If ethnically-biased education has played a vital 
role in the onset of civil conflict in the past, then an understanding of this topic will be 
crucial to identifying early warning signs of civil conflict and human rights abuses that 
may not have been utilized. Therefore, educational factors ought to be a larger focus of 
the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review and NGO human rights and 
development reports. In addition, a better understanding of this topic and the root causes 
of conflict can equally help shape educational policy in countries either already affected 
by civil conflict or teetering on the brink of civil conflict. Education should play a vital 
role in the development of poor countries, not only in the present, but for shaping future 
generations of tolerant, informed citizens for a more peaceful and economically-thriving, 
global society.  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Chapter Two: A Review of the Literature 
 The majority of past research on the connection between education and civil 
conflict either dealt with a lack of educational access as a motivator of grievance leading 
up to civil conflict  or policy-oriented strategies related to post-conflict educational 4
reconstruction.  Beyond these articles, there are several resources that are helpful in 5
either offering a broad perspective of educational factors that lead to civil conflict or 
specific qualitative case studies that have been performed in certain countries. 
Nonetheless, there exists little research on the effects of the quality of educational 
curricular content as a primary cause of civil conflict, which is where my thesis will 
hopefully be able to contribute to the existing literature.   
 In UNICEF’s original study, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, 
Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli examine both the positive and negative aspects of 
education’s effect on past ethnic conflicts. Bush and Saltarelli’s work recognizes the 
importance of ethnicity for a child’s socialization and identity formation, as well as how 
ethnicity has been manipulated through education. Thus, an uneven distribution of 
education for purposes of cultural repression and segregation, as well as a rewriting of 
textbooks are cited as negative aspects of education’s effect on ethnic conflict. On the 
other hand, linguistic and ethnic tolerance, citizenship values, and equal educational 
opportunities are listed as positive aspects in terms of avenues by which education can be 
 See Barakat and Urdal, “Breaking the Waves?”; Cf. Marie Besancon, “Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, 4
Revolutions, and Genocides,” Journal of Peace Research vol. 42, no. 4 (July 2005); Cf. Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers vol. 56, no. 4 (October 2004); Cf. Nicholas 
Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War,” Perspectives on Politics vol. 2, no. 2 (June 
2004); Cf. Tadjoeddin and Murshed, “Socio-Economic Determinants of Everyday Violence in Indonesia.”
 See Ishiyama and Breuning, “Educational Access and Peace Duration in Post-Conflict Countries.”5
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used to mitigate ethnic conflict. The purpose of Bush and Saltarelli’s work is not to focus 
solely on the causes of ethnic conflict, per se, but to propose a peacebuilding education 
for the future in developing countries.  6
 Since Bush and Saltarelli’s work, the research on education and civil conflict has 
proliferated, eventually leading to UNESCO’s annual EFA Global Monitoring Report, as 
well as the book, The Hidden Crisis. Within this report, UNESCO identified the 
educational needs and pitfalls of countless countries affected by civil conflict. The 
majority of the book is focused on how armed conflict can act as a barrier to EFA, with a 
purpose towards laying out a plan for financing peacebuilding and educational 
reconstruction globally. Nonetheless, one chapter does highlight various educational 
failures that may “fan the flames” of armed conflict, such as ethnic segregation, 
reinforcing a culture of violence, and linguistic repression. Again, the purpose of The 
Hidden Crisis is to lay out the goals of attaining EFA, while highlighting the failures of 
the international community in response to global educational needs and financing.  In 7
sum, UNICEF’s Two Faces and UNESCO’s Hidden Crisis represent the overview of a 
much bigger problem as it relates to education’s effect on civil conflict and vice versa. 
 In response to The Hidden Crisis and EFA’s failures, Patrick Montjourides 
pinpoints an additional “failure” as a lack of education data in general. Montjourides 
concludes that robust data can help inform and design good policy choices, predict future 
trends, and monitor educational policy impact.  Unfortunately, countries in conflict do 8
 See Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli, editors, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a 6
Peacebuilding Education for Children (Florence: United Nations Children’s Fund Innocenti Research Centre, 2000).
 See Watkins, The Hidden Crisis.7
 See Patrick Montjourides, “Education Data in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Fifth Failure,”   8
Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education vol. 43, no. 1 (2013).
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not make gathering this type of data a high priority for obvious reasons. Nonetheless, 
Montjourides states that “poor-quality, or completely absent, data deny millions of 
children the right to education,” since such data could certainly help international 
organizations, such as UNICEF, to lead educational reform in countries ravaged by civil 
conflict.  Thus, a key deterrent of research in this field and this present thesis stems from 9
a lack of data, enrollment records, and textbooks to be examined. 
 Beyond these chief overviews and their varied responses, several articles have 
been written from a much more focused perspective. For example, in “Education in Peace 
Agreements,” Kendra Dupuy notes the varying degrees to which education is addressed 
in over 100 peace agreements in the post-Cold War era. Perhaps more importantly, Dupuy 
examines how education is viewed as a long-term, key element to achieving sustainable 
peace in countries affected by civil conflict and how education has played a contributory 
role in the outbreak of civil conflict in countries such as Sudan and Sierra Leone through 
its exclusionary curriculum or segregated classroom settings.  10
 Additionally, Lynn Davies, in her article “Schools and War,” addresses the 
growing concerns raised in terms of education creating situations ripe for conflict through 
inequality and exclusion, a perpetuation of ethnic or religious divisions, and a curriculum 
that emphasizes a narrow worldview. In this regard, Davies presents various remedies 
that include civic education and comparative educational studies that pinpoint educational 
contributions to either peace or conflict. In general, Davies lobbies for greater research 
 Ibid, 85.9
 See Kendra Dupuy, “Education in Peace Agreements, 1989-2005,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly vol. 26, no. 2 10
(December 2008).
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into the effects of peace versus war-time education, as well as why young people join 
fundamentalist or extremist religious movements.  11
 Clayton Thyne in, “ABC’s, 123’s and the Golden Rule,” proposes two arguments: 
1) that educational investment provides a sign to the people that the government is 
interested in improving their lives and welfare and 2) that education can generate stability 
by giving people the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully, which makes them less likely 
to violently rebel. Thyne’s findings show that educational investment lowers the 
probability of civil war, especially when it is distributed equitably across the country to 
all classes and people groups. Furthermore, enrollment rates and literacy rates were 
shown to increase low-level political protests, but decrease violent forms of rebellion, 
which shows that educated citizens are more stable in that they use the political processes 
in their possession to seek peaceful solutions to various problems, rather than war.  12
 Gudrun Ostby and Henrik Urdal in their work, “Education and Civil Conflict: A 
Review of the Quantitative, Empirical Literature,” overview the research that has been 
done in the field of education and civil conflict, highlighting the strengths of the literature 
and the areas for further research. Ostby and Urdal readily admit that the majority of past 
research in this area has been qualitative, with scant international quantitative data 
available. In general, Ostby and Urdal recognize education’s role in either promoting 
peace or conflict; and with the quantitative data that is available, they argue that 
secondary enrollment statistics remain the major discriminators in terms of understanding 
 See Lynn Davies, “Schools and War: Urgent Agendas for Comparative and International Education,” Compare: A 11
Journal of Comparative Education vol. 35, no. 4 (December 2005).
 See Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule.”12
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education’s connection to civil conflict onset, since it is young males who primarily make 
up militant and rebel groups.  However, Ostby and Urdal further note a serious lack of 13
quantitative analyses on the effects of “educational quality or content.”  14
 In this regard, terrorist and extremist activity is a prime example of why it is not 
just about educational access, but content and quality as well. It is widely assumed that 
terrorists are ignorant or act out of desperation in their poverty, which would lead one to 
assume a lack of education as the only causal factor for their joining extremist 
movements, but such is not the case. As Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova prove in 
“Education, Poverty, and Terrorism,” terrorists tend to be highly-educated and from more 
privileged backgrounds than was previously assumed, since such recruits are more likely 
to possess an understanding of political participation and have the luxury to strongly 
commit to an ideological cause.  Furthermore, an examination by Claude Berrebi 15
entitled, “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Among 
Palestinians,” examines Palestinian curricula to show why educational content matters 
when thinking through the ramifications of highly-educated Hamas militants:  
Palestine is your country… that its pure soil is drenched with the blood of 
Martyrs… Answer this: Why must we fight the Jews and drive them out of 
our land? Without blood not even one centimeter will be liberated… The 
oppressors [Israel] have overstepped the boundary. Therefore Jihad and 
sacrifice are a duty.   16
 See Ostby and Urdal, “Education and Civil Conflict.”13
 Ibid, 24.14
 See Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal   15
Connection?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2003).
 Claude Berrebi, “Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism among   16
Palestinians,” Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy vol. 13, no. 1 (2007), 29.
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Thus, as Berrebi concludes, “These are sufficient to suggest that policy makers, when 
trying to reduce terrorism via education, should focus not solely on the amount of 
education but also on its content.”  17
 Several other works have focused on specific case studies in a qualitative, 
interview format, especially in Rwanda. In “The Role of Education in Driving Conflict 
and Building Peace: The Case of Rwanda,” Lyndsay McLean Hilker studies the 
relationship between education, conflict, and peacebuilding in the Rwandan genocide and 
aftermath. Her research was based primarily on interviews commissioned by the EFA 
Global Monitoring Report put out by UNESCO in 2011. Hilker’s research proves that a 
major cause of the Rwandan genocide can be linked to educational content and access. 
Prior to the genocide, there were significant inequalities of access to education based on 
class, ethnicity, and region. Similarly, state curricula emphasized a history of ethnic 
differences and past conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi, which can be traced to the 
influence of Belgian colonial powers. This inequality of educational access, coupled with 
the intolerant curriculum, led to a number of young children taking part in the Rwandan 
genocide.  Similarly, Anna Obura’s book, Never Again and Elisabeth King’s work, From 18
Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda, closely mirror Hilker’s assessment of the role that 
Rwanda’s educational system played in exacerbating its civil conflict and genocide, 
though both of their works have the added focus of creating an educational reconstruction 
 Ibid, 29.17
 See Lyndsay McLean Hilker, “The Role of Education in Driving Conflict and Building Peace: The   18
Case of Rwanda,” Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education vol. 41, no. 2 (2011).
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policy that builds on civic values, a shared Rwandan identity outside of tribalism, and an 
honest retelling of its history from both a Hutu and Tutsi perspective.  19
 In sum, through a review of the literature, it is evident that there are two major 
avenues by which countries have failed their citizens from an educational standpoint: a 
lack of access to education and an ethnically-charged curricula that promotes intolerance 
and fosters fear and hatred. Despite the influence of these works, it must be noted that the 
majority of past research on education and civil conflict has not focused on educational 
systems prior to the civil conflict. Thus, more research needs to be done from a 
theoretical standpoint as to why education might instigate or mitigate civil conflict, rather 
than focusing completely on educational reconstruction. It is my hope that my thesis will 
contribute to this literature by further answering the question of how the quality and 
content of education contributes to civil conflict onset, as well as comparing the available 
data across several cases to better understand the commonalities and patterns of how 
curricular content causes civil conflict and how it might be used to mitigate civil conflict 
in the future.  
 See Anna Obura, Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda (Paris: International Institute for Educational 19
Planning, 2003). Cf. Elisabeth King, From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).
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Chapter Three: Quantitative Analyses of the Connection Between Levels of 
Educational Attainment and Civil Conflict 
 There have been multiple studies that have focused on the connection between 
educational statistics and civil conflict onset through quantitative analyses. In the 
majority of cases, educational variables are deemed statistically significant when it comes 
to examining their causal connections to civil conflict onset or resumption; however, 
there also exists wide differences of opinion as to questions of endogeneity. Where all 
research can agree is the importance of secondary enrollment variables as “the most 
suitable discriminator in assessing the role of education in conflict.”  Nonetheless, 20
several authors question whether education is any discriminator at all, or whether their 
findings are simply conflating education with levels of poverty or development, ethnic 
tensions in general, or regime type. Similarly, research is varied on the role of higher 
education, the effects of religious schooling, and even the core question of why education 
affects conflict onset in general: whether as a grievance of lost economic opportunity or 
as a tool of political manipulation.  In order to address these questions, my research will 21
highlight former studies performed by Clayton Thyne and Bilal Barakat and Henrik Urdal 
in order to show that there is indeed a causal connection between education and civil 
conflict that can be proven quantitatively, but also to point out that mere statistics cannot 
answer this question in full.  
 In his seminal study, Thyne combines education variables to a previous study 
performed by James Fearon and D. David Laitin in 2003 entitled, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, 
 Ostby and Urdal, “Education and Civil Conflict,” 12-13.20
 Ibid, 21.21
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and Civil War,” which tested various hypotheses on civil conflict onset. Thyne’s dataset 
includes 160 countries from 1980 to 1999 and utilizes various control variables from 
Fearon and Laitin, such as prior war, population measurements, mountainous terrain or 
contiguous territory, and regime type, among others.  The dependent variable is civil 22
conflict onset, and the independent variables are educational in nature: investment in 
education, primary enrollment rates, secondary enrollment rates, postsecondary 
enrollment rates, and adult literacy. By performing various quantitative analyses on this 
dataset, Thyne finds that an increase in the following variables from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean results in the 
following respective decreases in the probability of civil conflict onset: 73% decrease for 
an increase in primary enrollment rates, 54% decrease for an increase in educational 
 Thyne, “ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule,” 739.22
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expenditures, 43% decrease for and increase in adult literacy, and 63% decrease for an 
increase in secondary enrollment rates.  Thyne readily admits that his study could suffer 23
from endogeneity, though he is adamant in stating that educational variables are not 
merely conflating questions of poverty, as some claim. He proves this by performing a 
further test separated by wealth and resource type to show that educational statistics are 
still a strong indicator of civil conflict onset probability.  Thyne produces the graph 24
shown in figure 1 above to highlight the connection between levels of enrollment and 
civil conflict probability, which is most drastic and progressive among male youths. In 
general, an increase in educational opportunities for young children and youth and further 
investment in education from the government will drastically reduce probabilities of civil 
conflict, regardless of regime type or levels of poverty.  
 While Thyne focuses on probabilities of civil conflict onset based on general 
enrollment statistics, Barakat and Urdal focus on countries with large young male 
populations in low-income countries (youth bulges) and a more nuanced set of 
educational attainment statistics as causal factors for civil conflict onset. Barakat and 
Urdal utilized a dataset created by the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) that measures a variety of educational attainment statistics for 120 
countries from 1970 to 2000, which is considered by many to be the most complete 
educational dataset available.  IIASA’s educational data is the independent variable, and 25
domestic armed conflict onset as covered by the Uppsala/PRIO internal conflict study is 
 Ibid, 743. 23
 Ibid, 746-749.24
 Barakat and Urdal, “Breaking the Waves?” 3.25
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the dependent variable.  It must be noted that the IIASA dataset attempts to overcome 26
past deficiencies of UNESCO’s limited educational enrollment statistics by focusing on 
demographic analyses through educational attainment statistics gained through past 
censuses. In so doing, IIASA has succeeded in discovering the highest educational 
attainment of each age group in a population from either (1) no schooling, (2) some 
primary, (3) completed lower secondary, or (4) completed tertiary.  In this way, a better 27
educational profile of a population can be built from simple demographic methods, which 
can overcome past 
data deficiencies of 
entire years or 
periods of enrollment 
numbers lost due to 
civil conflict or poor 
record-keeping in 
failed states. 
Similarly, IIASA’s 
data can track 
enrollment progression of individuals and groups.   28
  Through their research, Barakat and Urdal prove that secondary enrollment 
attainment has a statistically significant effect on civil conflict, especially in low and 
 Ibid, 3, 7.26
 Ibid, 8.27
 Ibid, 7-8.28
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middle income countries with youth bulges. In table 1 shown above, Model 1 captures 
15-24 year old males in general; Model 2 represents the Relative Youth Cohort Size, 
which measures the dynamics of a working class by using a ratio of 15-29 year old 
workers vs. 30-44 year old workers; Model 3 adds education variables; Model 4 adds 
GDP, rather than mere development variables; and Model 5 constitutes secondary 
attainment statistics for both male and female. As can be seen particularly from Models 4 
and 5, secondary attainment statistics have a strong correlation to internal armed conflict. 
In conclusion, Barakat and Urdal conclude that educational variables have a strong 
pacifying effect.  In addition, a stratification model is run to answer the question of 29
whether education serves merely as a proxy for general development, which they are able 
to answer in the negative; thus, education does serve as a statistically significant 
discriminator on its own.  30
 In sum, it can be seen from these studies that there exists a causal connection 
between education and civil conflict from a quantitative perspective. In fact, past research 
has also been able to tentatively prove that educational variables are not merely proxies 
for core issues of general development. Indeed, secondary enrollment attainment in 
particular serves as an important discriminator of civil conflict regardless of regime type, 
resource type, or GDP. Nonetheless, statistics cannot tell the whole story; therefore, 
educational attainment, though causally connected to civil conflict, must be 
complemented by deeper research into the actual curricular content of schools.  
 Ibid, 14-15.29
 Ibid, 18.30
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Chapter Four: Curricular Content Analyses in Countries Affected by Civil Conflict 
— Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan 
 The Constitution of UNESCO states, “Since wars begin in the minds of men [and 
women], it is in the minds of men [and women] that the defenses of peace must be 
constructed.”  It is no secret that education plays an integral role in forming the 31
understandings, attitudes, and even behaviors of individuals, and it has long been seen as 
an important tool for fostering civic values and peace. However, what has been less 
understood is how education can equally foster “ethnic exclusivity,” a disdain for “the 
other,” and violent ambitions for the “homeland.”  In this regard, nationalism is a way 32
by which a people can define themselves and segregate themselves from others, and it 
has been used by various states to create a sense of allegiance, as well as fuel for conflict 
when an enemy threatens that allegiance. Within a nationalistic identity, there is a sense 
of preserving the uniqueness of the nation through labels, stereotypes, and categorization 
of those within the in-group and those without — “the enemy” — which is achieved 
through a standardization of culture and “nation-formation.”  Nationalism unites people 33
around common attributes and culture and a shared history that differentiates them from 
other peoples; but therein lies the problem, as nationalism throughout history has 
exacerbated differences to the extreme — many times along ethnic or religious lines. 
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 As a means of mass indoctrination, what is taught within the classroom plays a 
vital role in formulating and cultivating this national identity. Therefore, though 
understanding levels of educational attainment is important for a study of civil conflict, 
actual curricular content and the quality of that content are of far greater importance. In 
order to understand the effects of curricular content on civil conflict, this thesis will 
examine the case studies of Kosovo, Sudan, and Pakistan in order to pinpoint where 
ethnic or religious tensions are exacerbated through ideological images and language 
inserted in textbooks. In these countries, it becomes obvious that interest groups on both 
sides of each conflict utilized education as a means to instill a narrow national identity in 
the minds of future generations. Effective strategies include a rewriting or editing of 
history, a visual distortion of geography, extremist language and values, and a wide-scale 
homogenization of a heterogenous culture or religion through standardized syllabi. 
Kosovo 
 The conflict over Kosovo revolved around a simple question: to whom did 
Kosovo belong?  As Noel Malcom states, “All parties can agree that the issue of Kosovo 34
is, quite simply, the most intractable of all the political conflicts in the Balkans.”  Within 35
this conflict, education became a unique spark point of Kosovo’s sovereignty and 
nationhood for both parties since Serbs and Albanians alike understood that “the control 
of Kosovo’s education system emerged as tantamount to control of Kosovo’s territory.”  36
In fact, as Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland note, education lies at the very center of 
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the Kosovo conflict.  Under Serb control in the 1970s and 1980s, Kosovo’s schools were 37
primarily attended by Serbs and Montenegrins even with Albanians constituting around 
90% of the population.  Thus, from the beginning, ethnically-segregated classrooms 38
became a focal point of the Kosovo conflict. Eventually, Albanians responded to Serbian 
control of Kosovo’s classrooms and textbooks by opening an underground parallel 
education network within homes throughout the country as a means of secret resistance in 
the early 1990s. It is important to note the importance of this parallel education system 
because it was considered the only fully-functioning arm of the Kosovo “shadow state” 
under Albanian rule; because of this, it had a huge role politically and symbolically for 
Albanians seeking independence.  According to Denisa Kostovicova, the parallel 39
education system allowed an unprecedented level of conflicting nationalisms to develop 
in the classrooms and curricula on both sides. In effect, Serbs and Albanians alike were 
free from the influence of the other to edit and rewrite vast portions of their history and 
geography textbooks, leading to mutually exclusive understandings of Kosovo with little 
room for agreement. This, coupled with total ethnic segregation within the classrooms, 
severely exacerbated the Kosovo conflict.  In time, though the parallel education system 40
began as a non-violent protest, it eventually devolved into violent rebellion and armed 
conflict.  This section will examine Serb control of the education system and the 41
response of the Albanian parallel education system as separate attempts to homogenize 
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heterogeneous cultures, as well as the use of history, geography, and language within the 
textbooks of Kosovo’s competing curricula.  
 Even though most societies are ethnically heterogeneous, education systems often 
maintain a fiction of cultural homogeneity through a common language and history, as 
well as a national literature. Such was certainly the case in Kosovo, where the Serbian 
government adopted an education policy of “assimilation,” whereby the Albanian 
language was eliminated in schools and Serbian standardized textbooks that minimized 
the Albanian “minority national identity” were introduced — “measures that many blame 
for the ensuing strife.”  Loss of language was equated to Albanians since the time of the 42
Ottomans as a loss of nation itself; thus, rather than ensuring unity, such a policy by the 
Serbs incited a violent response from the Albanians.  Furthermore, in the 1980s, the 43
communist leadership saw Albanian textbooks as a hotbed of Albanian nationalism and, 
therefore, an “enemy ideology.” Thus, an “Action Programme” was put into effect that 
would analyze all curricula according to Marxist values in order to weed out any 
“nationalist consciousness.”  Albanian folk dances were removed from music curriculum 44
because they were “reminiscent of national consciousness,” as was all Albanian songs in 
general.  In the end, the Programme found the Albanian textbooks to be detrimental to 45
Kosovar peace because of their promotion of Albanian “self-management” at the expense 
of Yugoslav centrality and unity.  With control over the textbooks, Serbia wanted to 46
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foster a sense of belonging to the Yugoslav shared identity by essentially removing any 
ethnic and cultural differences within Kosovo.  In sum, the educational leadership were 47
attempting to promote a “political socialization” of unity that transcended ethnicity 
through a unified educational system and a curricular common core. However, this only 
reinforced Albanian feelings of repression, thus resulting in the parallel education 
system.  At the beginning of the 1991 school year, Albanians were completely excluded 48
from all schools in Kosovo and, in some cases, even barred from entrance by tanks.  49
 Homogenization was not just a goal of Serbs, but of Albanians as well when it 
came to their parallel education network. Any Albanian teacher who sympathized with 
Serbs or sought to include multiculturalism in the classroom were banished or even 
physically persecuted.  Furthermore, any opposition to the independence movement of 50
Albanian Kosovo was all but removed from Albanian history textbooks. In the two 
paragraphs that do describe any opposition, it is not clear that the opposition came from 
within Kosovo, but instead attributes it to Turkish and Bosnian Muslim troublemakers. 
Therefore, Albanians attempted to maintain the illusion of national unity in their struggle 
for Kosovar autonomy. Kostovicova calls this an “ironing” of factual history by 
smoothing out conflicts in favor of a vision of national unity and uniformity.  51
Interestingly enough, with the onset of the parallel education system, Kosovo Albanians 
attempted to create a unification of curricula across state lines with their Albanian 
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neighbors. However, similar hardships ensued as Kosovo Albanians had to fight for 
Kosovo-specific content in the newly-establish Albanian common core.  Thus, Serbian 52
communist leadership asserted an ideology of shared Yugoslav “brotherhood” in its 
curriculum, while Albanians promoted only its national identity, exclusive of all other 
interpretations and other minority people groups in the area. Both were insensitive to 
national diversity, though in different ways, which hindered multiculturalism.  In the 53
end, everything collapsed in late 1997, when passive student resistance gave way to 
armed struggle and support of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In a survey 
conducted by a student newspaper on students’ opinions towards solving the Kosovo 
problem, 8 percent favored passive pacifism, 64.5 percent argued for active pacifism, and 
27.5 percent called for armed struggle.  These KLA soldiers were subsequently 54
described as “martyrs” for the freedom of Kosovo. And in conclusion, one Albanian 
textbook states, “The freedom was won with blood, that is why it is sacred.”  55
 Textbooks in the Albanian parallel education system were based on the pre-1989 
Albanian-language curriculum. However, an underground textbook producer began 
smuggling in revisions and modifications in specific subjects, such as history, geography, 
music, and other cultural subjects, in order to include a “stronger focus on Kosovo 
Albanian interpretations.”  When certain subjects had little bearing on aspects of 56
nationhood, such as science or math, Albanians used the common core curriculum that 
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was developed in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade.  In light of this double standard, it becomes 57
obvious that nation formation was at the center of the Albanian parallel education system, 
which was most effectively implemented through history. 
 Albanians and Serbs each possessed a distinct understanding of the history of 
Kosovo, which can be seen from the multitude of differences in their respective 
textbooks. Indeed, Buckland and Sommers note that the majority of their interviews 
highlighted primarily differences in history.  For example, Albanians in Kosovo claimed 58
their descent to Illyrian ancestry, thus reinforcing the right to Kosovo land by way of 
“first occupation.” In effect, by linking their origins to a predecessor established in the 
land well before the arrival of the Slavs in the sixth century, Albanians could invoke prior 
claim over the Serbs.  In addition to espousing Illyrian origins, Albanian textbooks 59
depict Serbs as “colonists” or “occupiers,” as a means to represent Serbs as an external 
oppressor, rather than a settler in the territory alongside Albanians from early history.  60
On the other hand, in a Serb eighth grade textbook, Albanian presence in Kosovo is 
downplayed and explained as such: 
Even though Kosovo, Metohija, and Rajka were inhabited by a Serbian 
population back to the Middle Ages and were indisputable centres of Serbian 
statehood and spirituality, great demographic changes, to the detriment of the 
Serbs, occurred there during Turkish rule, and especially in the eighteenth 
century and the first half of the nineteenth. As cattle-breeders, Islamicized 
Albanians gradually occupied the mountain pastures in Kosovo and Metohija and 
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in Rajka and then descended into the fertile Kosovo valleys and lowlands, 
forcing out the native Serbian population.  61
Thus, neither side recognized the other as rightful claimants to Kosovo, and both utilized 
harsh language within their textbooks to not only make their own claims unquestionable, 
but to downplay the presence of the other and even to demean the other as either a 
colonist, an immigrant, or a backward nomad with no claim to the civilized centers of 
Kosovo. In fact, both accounts of history in the competing textbooks fail to account for 
the fact that Serbs and Albanians coexisted for over a millennium, thus deemphasizing 
their “shared experience” of centuries-long domination by outside forces.  62
 For both Serbs and Albanians, the Battle of Kosovo of 1389 remains integral to 
their competing national identities, but for different reasons and with different emphases. 
In this battle, a Balkan, multiethnic alliance fought against the Ottoman Muslims outside 
of Pristina. While the Balkan alliance lost this battle, it has been mythologized as a 
“spiritual victory” for both Serbs and Albanians, as it was thought to have played a key 
role in slowing the Ottoman advance throughout the rest of the Balkan peninsula and 
even Europe.  While such a momentous event could have acted as a connection point for 63
both people groups, it instead incited feelings of separate national identities through 
differing interpretations of the circumstances. Because of the central importance of Serb 
King Lazar in the battle, Serbs recognize the Battle of Kosovo as their defining moment 
and see Kosovo as “Heavenly Serbia.”  The Serbian heroism of this battle is 64
 Zivkovic and Radovic Gacesa, Istorija za II razred cetvorogodisnjih strucnih skola, 64 as quoted in Kostovicova, 61
Kosovo, 163.
 Sommers and Buckland, Parallel Worlds, 38.62
 Ibid, 35-37.63
 Ibid, 35. 64
!25
remembered through a particular flower native to the area. According to a Serbian 
teacher, “The flower that grows on Kosovo Polje lives on human blood [of the slain 
Serbian martyrs], so it can’t grow anywhere else.”  Within this Kosovo myth, there 65
exists a call, even an obligation, to return to reclaim what was lost.  And on the 66
memorial at the site, there also exists a curse: “Those who are Serbian and have a Serbian 
heart and do not come to battle for Kosovo will not have children, either male or female, 
crops or wine. They will be damned until they die.”  67
 However, in Albanian schools, the Serb King Lazar was present, but not 
ultimately the hero. The hero, according to an Albanian history textbook, was “one 
Albanian from Kosovo called Millosh, hidden among the dead, [who] attacked the Sultan 
and killed him with a knife,” thus glossing over the Serb centrality in the standard myth.  68
On the other hand, Serbian textbooks do not even mention Albanian participation.  69
Regardless of which case is true, neither text recognizes the multiethnic nature of this 
battle, nor the complementary roles of either people groups. Indeed, Kostovicova notes 
that when it came to the Battle of Kosovo, curricular input gave way to political 
maneuvering on both sides. Serb communist textbook writers were given free reign to 
interpret it according to the political agenda at the time, while the Albanian parallel 
education system followed suit.  70
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 Similarly, it must be noted the emphasis that Albanians placed on their national 
hero, Skanderbeg, who epitomized the struggle against the Ottoman and “served as a 
source of inspiration for unification of Albanians in the struggle to regain freedom.”  71
Indeed, textbooks in many countries worship heroes of war and martyrs, rather than 
heroes of peace. Thus, the advance of civilization through peacetime is diminished, while 
war and struggle become a central focus as movers of history. Therefore, violence is 
legitimized as an “expression of political power.”  In this case, the defense of Kosovo 72
required the ultimate sacrifice, much like Skanderbeg. Therefore, it is no wonder that one 
Albanian textbook extolls Albanians to “not to give a single inch of the homeland of 
Albanians to a foreign state. [They] would fight to the last man.”  However, the reality is 73
that Skanderbeg and the mythic heroes of the Battle of Kosovo were fighting against the 
same Turkish occupiers, eliciting “shared victimization.” However, resistance against 
outside forces is not the purpose of these mythologies in both sides’ curricula. Rather, 
both sides compete with “myths of the recovery of the same lost land.”  74
 Historical claims through words must be backed by geography as a visual 
depiction of nationhood.  When writing geography textbooks, Kostovicova notes that 75
there are various strategies of “spatial seduction” that can be used, such as visual 
distortion and misdirection.  In general, Kosovo is portrayed in Albanian textbooks as an 76
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independent nation since the early 1990s. Albanian cartographers even resorted to using 
bold lines to clearly delineate the borders of Kosovo as an independent state; whereas 
with Serbian maps, Kosovo was oftentimes not represented at all or given a dotted-line 
boundary in order to render the illusion that it had always been a part of the Serb 
republic.  Thus, the territorial grievance of Kosovo for Albanians was a main motif of 77
both history and geography textbooks as the “biggest historical injustice.”  78
 Finally, Albanian’s textbooks use vivid language to describe their victimized 
history in light of Serbian “brutality,” juxtaposed with Albanian “martyrdom.” For 
example, one passage from an Albanian textbook states, “The conquering Serbian army 
committed large massacres. Tens of Albanian villages and towns were turned into ashes. 
Thousands of Albanian men, women, children, and the elderly were killed in a barbarian 
manner.”  By using terminology such as massacre and barbarian, the Albanians utilized 79
extremist language in order to incite fear and hatred. Similarly, Albanians describe the 
conflict with religious undertones, saying that Serbs implemented “forced conversion 
from Islam and Catholicism to Orthodoxy.”  They also frequent such terms as 80
“genocide” to describe Serb oppression, while martyrdom is a key aspect to describe the 
struggle in general. For example, in the struggle that created the Serbian state, the 
Albanian textbooks state that “thirty martyrs fell for the freedom of Kosovo during the 
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demonstrations.”  In effect, through the textbooks, martyrdom was given more 81
legitimacy than other forms of resistance that did not cost lives. 
 Furthermore, by omitting any other casualty other than Albanians in the civil 
conflict, the parallel education curriculum gave the sense of “exclusive victimhood.” 
Oftentimes, high casualty numbers were used with no reference, and “a frequent use of 
words like ‘massacre’ and ‘genocide’  precluded any questioning of Albanian victimhood 
in Kosovo.”  On the flip side, Serbian textbooks explain that “Separatist and nationalist 82
Albanian groups were active in Kosovo… They conducted terror against the Serbian 
people, burnt the Serbian villages and forced the Serbian settlers to emigrate.”  Thus, 83
through one-sided history, Albanians are portrayed as the sole instigators of violence in 
Kosovo.  Finally, the derogatory term, Siptar, is commonly used by the Serbs in their 84
textbooks at this time to refer to Albanians as less than human.  85
 If we are to understand the effects of the Albanian curricula in practice, we need 
look no further than the assignments that students turned in while studying in the parallel 
education system. Kostovicova includes several poems written by Albanian children in 
the latter half of the 1990s, which covered the period when fighting between Serbian 
security forces and Albanian armed guerrillas broke out. This is the moment when 
resistance was no longer passive in terms of the parallel educational system, but active in 
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armed conflict, and these poems reflect that transition of resistance as well.  86
Interestingly enough, poems without a nationalistic topic, such as family or activities, are 
few. Instead, the themes most discussed are “homeland, emigration, freedom, schools, 
resistance, and repression.”  These poems closely mirror what has been discussed in the 87
previous sections. For example, on martyrdom, one student states, “Hundreds of 
thousands of martyrs for you, freedom, gave a life.” Another says, “I am not little, I am 
telling you the truth, if there’s a need for Kosovo, I’d sacrifice life.”  In terms of the 88
importance of knowledge and education connected to freedom and Kosovar 
independence, another student advises, “Let’s learn, oh friends, because only with 
knowledge will we crush the enemy, can we win freedom, liberate the fatherland.”  89
Similarly, essays written by students are filled with hateful language, especially when the 
fighting broke out: “Your heart fills with hatred towards the Serbs, because the Serbs are 
brutal, blood-sucking, treacherous, merciless people who have no drop of mercy in their 
unfortunate heart.”  From these examples, it is obvious that the Albanian nationalism 90
and demonization of “the other” present in the parallel education system incited feelings 
of hatred, fear, and a longing for glory in martyrdom and violence. 
 In conclusion, the case of Kosovo shows that an attempt at homogenization of a 
culturally-diverse territory through systematized education does not result in unity, but 
resistance and even violence. At the same time, completely distinct curricula on both 
sides of a conflict, especially in history and geography, that not only refuses to recognize 
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“the other,” but demeans and demonizes them as well, certainly incites an equal amount 
of hatred. Interestingly enough, Sommers and Buckland recognized a common theme 
from both Albanian and Serb interviewees alike: the desire for the researchers to tell an 
“objective story” in their curricular analysis.  In other words, both sides wanted their 91
sides to be represented and understood, which must be the starting point for building a 
curricula in any conflict-torn country. Still, the question must be asked: did the 
educational situation in Kosovo contribute to the violence? Bush and Sartarelli conclude: 
“There can be no doubt that the schism in education in Kosovo was a major contributor to 
the upsurge of violence that reached its horrifying zenith in 1999.”  Similarly, when the 92
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took control, their initial response was that 
teachers should use the existing curriculum, but “should avoid content or teaching that 
may inflame conflict.”  Thus, it was understood from an outside perspective that 93
education had a very real effect on the civil conflict. In sum, the case study of Kosovo is 
useful for this thesis as education was not only a primary focal point of the conflict, but 
also a primary instigator of ethnic and nationalistic differences. 
Pakistan 
 Unlike other countries oftentimes cited in the education-civil conflict literature, 
Pakistan’s problem does not lie in enrollment statistics or access to education — areas 
where it tends to do comparatively well. Rather, the Pakistan “educational anomaly” 
stems from the extreme polarization between the madrasah system and the public 
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system.  Nonetheless, both systems overlap in their propensities for instilling a repulsion 94
towards Hindus, while simultaneously portraying Pakistan as completely and 
unquestionably Sunni-Muslim with no room for differences. The Pakistani state-
sponsored curricula and textbooks further this policy through its depiction of history and 
geography, as well as its use of extreme or one-sided language and images. Of particular 
note within the Pakistani public school system, the infamous Gilgit “textbook 
controversy” relates a conflict that emerged precisely over biased curricular content and a 
lack of minority representation. In terms of Pakistani religious education, it is no secret 
that the madrasahs, through their unobstructed extremist views, have supplied jihadists in 
the fight against Hindus and Shia Muslims within Pakistan for years now. 
 Much has been made in recent years about the extremism originating from 
Pakistan’s madrasahs; however, as A.H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim note, madrasahs are 
not the only educational institution breeding hatred within Pakistan: “the educational 
material in the government run schools do much more than madrasahs. The textbooks tell 
lies, create hatred, inculcate militancy, and much more.”  This is accomplished through 95
the creation of a narrow Islamic identity.  Therefore, it can be said that the main problem 96
within the Pakistani public education system is its homogenization agenda along Sunni 
Muslim lines, at the expense of Hindu and Shia minorities, who are oftentimes violently 
discriminated against as a result.  
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 The genesis of this homogenization can be traced back to General Zia-ul-Haq’s 
coup in 1977 and the military government that followed. Throughout the 1980s, Zia-ul-
Haq introduced a policy of “Islamization” in Pakistani culture and history, thus 
portraying Pakistan as a “besieged state that is under threat from a Hindu India on the one 
hand and an anti-Islamic West on the other.” Such a policy has given younger generations 
“an inherently paranoid outlook” towards ethnic and sectarian differences, leading to 
oftentimes extremist ideologies.  This period of Islamization particularly affected 97
Pakistani textbooks through “a distorted narration of history, factual inaccuracies, 
inclusion of hate material, a disproportionate inclusion of Islamic studies in other 
disciplines, glorification of war and the military.” To make matters worse, governments 
since then and up until present day have “either failed to check these harmful deviations, 
or willingly perpetuated them.”  National curricula and textbooks are designed by the 98
Curriculum Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education and the regional Text Book 
Boards, and it is this centralized system of education formation that is “perfectly suitable 
for ideological indoctrination.”   99
 In general, the public education system has been used to downplay religious 
diversity in Pakistan. A common principle that appears in the Pakistani pedagogical 
documents throughout every grade is the following: “In the teaching material, no concept 
of separation between the worldly and the religious be given; rather all the material be 
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presented from the Islamic point of view.”  Not only does this learning outcome leave 100
little room for civic engagement outside the religious realm, but it also discriminates 
against non-Muslim minorities, who undoubtedly feel excluded from the classroom and 
society. In order to implement this Islamic understanding, textbooks utilize recitations of 
creeds and statements, as can be seen in a class 6 English textbook on “Our Country”: 
“Who am I? I am a Muslim. I am a Pakistani. I love my country and I love my people… 
You know that you are a Muslim and your religion is Islam.”  Thus, Pakistani students 101
are told exactly who they are and are coerced into agreeing with such statements. 
 Not only do textbooks homogenize along Muslim lines, but they instill hatred 
towards Hindus through extremist language and images, as can be seen from a class 5 
Urdu textbook: “Hindu has always been the enemy of Islam.”  Similarly, a different 102
class 5 textbook attempts to describe the Hindu religion as inferior to Islam with the 
following imagery: “Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark places, 
where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In our 
mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.”  By utilizing 103
negative terms such as “narrow,” “dark,” and “idols,” this particular textbook paints a 
picture of the Hindu religion and culture as backwards. Thus, textbooks are clearly 
utilized to instill a hatred towards Hindus through such negative statements. 
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 Historical inaccuracies are similarly used to create hatred towards Hindus. 
Consider the following comments about Pakistan’s violent past: “The British, with the 
assistance of the Hindus, adopted a cruel policy of mass exodus against the Muslims to 
erase them as a nation.” Similarly, “[The Muslims] were not allowed to profess their 
religion freely.” Later on, this same textbook states, “Hindu nationalism was being 
imposed upon Muslims and their culture.”  Again, Pakistani textbooks highlight 104
Hindus’ role as the enemy of Muslims without giving due regard to Muslims’ role in 
similar conflicts. In this regard, another textbook attempts to portray how much more 
civil Muslims have been in times of conflict as such: “The Hindus in Pakistan were 
treated very nicely when they were migrating as opposed to the inhuman treatment meted 
out to the Muslim migrants from India.”  Thus, the educational establishment has been 105
able to shift any blame away from the Muslim majority’s own discriminatory policies and 
instead identify themselves as the innocent victims in a historical struggle. They have 
also been able to maintain the morality of their own policies towards other people groups 
as a superior civilization. 
 After examining the history textbooks of Pakistan, Salim states that “students 
don’t learn history. Rather, they are forced to read a carefully crafted collection of 
falsehoods and fairy tales. History has been used to churn out a mythology about the 
struggle that led to the creation of Pakistan.”  For example, in describing the 106
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partitioning of the subcontinent and the struggle with India, Pakistani understanding is 
that Hindu and Sikh enemies “killed and dishonored thousands, nay hundreds of 
thousands of women, children, the old and the young with extreme cruelty and 
heartlessness.” However, such a message fails to take into account the fact that Muslims 
were also aggressors at this time and stand condemned for slaughter, rape, and other 
atrocities.  Finally, an examination of the “Civics for Pakistan” for classes 11 and 12 107
presents a history of violence by Hindus against Muslims without any retaliation.  Thus, 108
through a biased history and extremist language embedded within their textbooks, the 
Muslim establishment is able to build national unity founded on hatred towards Hindus. 
 It is interesting to note that such a one-sided portrayal of history was not always 
the case in Pakistani education. Pakistani textbooks in the 1950s and 1960s, before the 
coup of 1977, regarded Hindu history and culture in an “appreciative manner.” For 
example, the textbooks of this time tend to recount the “grandeur” of the early Hindu and 
Buddhist kingdoms “without any element of denigration.”  In fact, these textbooks were 109
able to present a critical eye towards their own checkered past: 
We have a high regard for Mohammad bin Qasim. He laid the foundation 
for the Muslim rule in India. But the first brick of the foundation was 
defective… Had Mohammad bin Qasim and the conquerors that followed 
relied less on sword to increase their numerical strength and more on 
preaching and other methods, we would have been spared events because 
of which we are presently facing tribulations.  110
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Thus, it can be seen that the new mentality of hatred towards Hinduism stemmed from 
the Islamization following the coup. Since then, the accounts of Muslim kings have been 
falsified, distorted, and glorified to fit the program of Islamization.  In the new 111
curricula, anytime the word Hindu appears, it is usually always joined to negatively-
charged adjectives such as “conniving” or “manipulative.”  112
 In Pakistan’s new understanding of its creation, Muhammad-bin-Qasim, who 
appeared in the previously critical quote, is considered the first Pakistani citizen, who 
overthrew the “infidel,” “cruel,” and “despotic” Sindhi King Raja Dahir. The people in 
the region, “who were tired of the cruelties of Raja Dahir, joined hands with Muhammad-
bin-Qasim because of his good treatment.”  Textbooks further go on to say: 113
For the first time, the people of Sindh were introduced to Islam, its 
political system, and way of government. The people here had seen only 
the atrocities of the Hindu Rajas… the people of Sindh were so much 
impressed by the benevolence of Muslims that they regarded Muhammad-
bin-Qasim as their savior… On his departure from Sindh, the local people 
were overwhelmed with grief.  114
In sum, the Pakistani textbooks attempt to present a smooth, unified history of Pakistan 
that excludes any notion of the “two nation theory,” while firmly denying any examples 
of a history of mutual co-existence between Muslims and Hindus.  115
 Furthermore, violence and jihad are common learning outcomes for the Pakistani 
public education system. Several curricular directives and textbooks advise activities in 
the classroom that include making speeches on the importance of jihad and for teachers 
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to “judge their spirits” while students make such speeches.  In this regard, war and 116
martyrdom are glorified through images and anecdotes of Pakistani heroes of war. In 
effect, Pakistani textbooks completely exclude “heroes from civil society” as role models 
or inspirational figures.  As Nayyar and Salim note, “Peace is the biggest and the most 117
urgent need for Pakistan.” However, learning outcomes call for a portrayal of enemy 
images, a glorification of war and the use of force, and encouragement towards jihad.  118
For example, a class 1 social studies textbook’s cover is full of military images such as 
missiles and soldiers being trained, and a class 4 social studies textbook includes several 
pictures of battle and captions calling students to “always be ready to fight.”  Several 119
textbooks urge students to become martyrs, to recognize the importance of jihad, with a 
learning outcome to “create yearning for jihad in his heart.”  120
 Not only has education been used to instill hatred and violence towards Hindus 
and outsiders, but it has been equally used to cause divisions within Muslim sectarianism. 
In the Gilgit textbook controversy, particular images within state-sponsored Pakistani 
textbooks promoted only Sunni understandings of the Islamic faith. Thus, it is argued that 
these textbooks were utilized to further homogenize an Islamization program along even-
narrower Sunni lines at the expense of Shia minorities. According to Nosheen Ali, “In 
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official curricula in Pakistan, the idealized and authorized Pakistani citizen is assumed to 
be the Sunni Muslim, while other ways of being Muslim are silenced.”  As will be seen, 121
this occurs through visual depictions of religious faith and practice, as well as through a 
singular viewpoint of Muslim key figures and authorities.  The textbooks in question 122
covered the major disciplines of Islamiat, Urdu, and social studies, and were developed 
by the Punjab Textbook Board, which was composed of four Sunni scholars. These 
textbooks were considered particularly egregious at the primary school level for their lack 
of Shia representation, as well as their strong assertion of Sunni rituals on the 
impressionable younger students.  123
 Nosheen Ali, “Outrageous State, Sectarianized Citizens: Deconstructing the ‘Textbook Controversy’ in the Northern 121
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 For example, on the page shown above from a grade 1 textbook, the prayer rituals 
favor a Sunni representation, since Shia typically keep their hands loose at their sides, 
rather than folded in front as the image shows.  This is especially problematic as 124
children see different practices at home and school, which disgruntled parents argued 
could lead them gumrah (astray).  Similarly, the picture to the right is taken from a 125
grade 7 textbook, which is designed to help students imitate calligraphy of the four 
caliphs: Abu Bak, Umar, Usman, and Ali, which is not in line with Shia beliefs, who 
question the caliphate system and, instead, view Ali as the first iman.  The calligraphy 126
exercises are particularly important, since a similar exercise caused a student to tear the 
page out of his textbook, thus prompting the student boycott that led to the conflict.  127
 The conflict ensued due to the fact that 75% of the Northern Areas of Pakistan are 
Shia Muslim, which is not the case in the majority of Pakistan. For a state attempting to 
homogenize along Sunni Muslim lines, “the Shia-majority Northern Areas thus constitute 
a significant source of anxiety.”  Leaders in the Northern Areas argued that they should 128
have their own textbook board to revise their own curricula like other areas of Pakistan. 
However, such a demand was seen as an assertion of regional sovereignty, which was a 
threat to the unified Pakistani state, thus causing the government crackdown on this 
particular issue.  In the end, the controversy resulted in a violent confrontation between 129
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Pakistani state authorities and Shia protestors in the region.  In total, over one hundred 130
people lost their lives in the Gilgit textbook controversy. Victims included Shia children 
traveling on buses, who were singled out as non-Sunni through their ID cards and killed 
accordingly.  In general, the controversy was engineered as a symbol of a history of 131
religious suppression in the Northern Areas and has further intensified the sectarian 
differences in the region.  The results in the short term have been further sect-specific 132
segregation throughout schools in Pakistan with no long-term solutions in sight.  133
 Another form of education in Pakistan is the religious schools known as the 
madrasahs. These are located all over the country and provide free education, as well as 
free food, housing, and clothing. Because they are privately-funded and outside state 
supervision, they are free to spread a “narrow and violent version of Islam.”  In 134
addition, madrasahs only offer religious instruction, thus ignoring math, science, and 
other important subjects needed to function in society as a well-rounded citizen. In so 
doing, graduates cannot find work because of a lack of practical education and are, 
therefore, encouraged to fulfill their “spiritual obligations” by engaging in guerrilla 
warfare and martyrdom against Hindus and other sects of Muslims throughout 
Pakistan.  It is estimated that 10% to 15% of Pakistan’s thousands of madrasahs teach 135
such extremist ideology.  And because they are free, these schools are able to attract 136
poor families, who believe that the free education, food, and training will lead to better 
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circumstances in this life and the one to come.  Pakistan’s interior minister Moinuddin 137
Haider recognized the dangers the madrasahs pose when he said, “The brand of Islam 
they are teaching is not good for Pakistan… Some, in the garb of religious training, are 
busy fanning sectarian violence, poisoning people’s minds.” Thus, Haider announced 
reforms that would require madrasahs to register with the government, expand their 
curricula, and end the militant training camps.  Nonetheless, these schools continue to 138
flourish across Pakistan, and their curricular content and practices have even been 
exported to terrorist and guerrilla groups across the globe.  139
 Christine Fair represents a counter-study to the recent focus on madrasah by 
surveying 141 families of slain militants or shaheed (martyrs) and determines that the 
majority of Pakistani jihadists are highly-educated, but not from the madrasahs as has 
been assumed. In her study, she notes that only 12% of her respondents attended 
madrasah, of whom only 7% actually obtained a certificate, which would take at least 2 
years of religious education. She concludes that such research shows that only about 4% 
of Pakistanis actually attend madrasah full time.  Similarly, she finds that only 22% of 140
respondents had less than a “matriculation,” which would be the equivalent of passing the 
10th grade; however, according to the 1998 Census of Pakistan, only 32% of males 
reached the matriculation stage, thus showing that Pakistani militants tend to be more 
highly-educated than the population and more educated than the majority of the countries 
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studied in the education-civil conflict literature.  Also of note, the majority of these 141
slain militants were between the ages of 17 and 25, and 26% claimed to have been 
recruited directly from an educational institution, whether madrasah or public, thus 
highlighting the role that education has played in not only promoting jihadist ideology, 
but actively pushing students into military action.  Fair concludes: 142
When ones considers that throughout all of Pakistan fewer than one in 
three males are matriculates, and when one considers further that the bulk 
of this sample was derived from the Northwest Frontier Province where 
educational attainment is among the lowest in Pakistan, the males in this 
sample are extremely well educated, again underscoring the need to 
interrogate common assumptions that Pakistan’s militants are all 
uneducated, madaris products.  143
Thus, madrasah reform is not enough for Pakistan, since both public and religious 
schools stand condemned for fostering feelings of jihad and intolerance. Since the 
majority of these martyrs came from public schools, reforms must begin there. 
 In sum, the case study of Pakistan further proves that homogenization through 
biased curricular standardization can lead to societal divisions and violent outbreaks. The 
textbook controversy represents a unique example in this thesis in that the curricular 
content not only incited sectarian differences that led to conflict, but the very nature of 
the conflict itself was waged over revising the curricula. Pakistan would do well to learn 
from the textbook controversy and incorporate a plethora of viewpoints in its textbooks, 
not only to ease sectarian strife, but to silence the hatred towards Hindus as well. On the 
other hand, the madrasahs are an example of the damage that can be done by an 
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educational institution free from all state restraint, while demonstrating the fact that 
governments should provide free education, as well as food programs to all primary 
school-age children at the least. Finally, Pakistan further proves that enrollment statistics 
alone do not tell the whole story, since Pakistani militants tend to be highly-educated. 
Sudan 
 The main reason why peace talks failed between the North and the South until 
2005 in Sudan was because of the Northern-based government’s unwillingness to 
recognize the country’s ethnic and religious diversity. Prior to South Sudan’s 
independence in 2011, the Muslim Arabs in the North maintained control of the 
government and the country’s policies, even though they represented a minority of the 
Sudanese population.  Their plan throughout their rule was to establish an Islamic state 144
based on sharia law, which included a subordination of rationality and modernist 
discourse in favor of a literal, dogmatic interpretation of the Qur’an and its influence 
over all areas of life. Anyone opposing such a plan was seen as opposing the very will of 
Allah.  This “Islamization” effectively marginalized all other beliefs and religious faiths 145
by drawing a sharp distinction between “believers and infidels.”  As a key proponent of 146
this ideology, the educational system in the North was thoroughly Islamized as well, 
resulting in an attempted homogenization of a heterogeneous culture. By rewriting the 
educational curricula along Arabic lines in history, geography, and intertwining Muslim 
beliefs in all other subjects as well, the Northern government split the Sudanese state 
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along ethnic and religious lines, thus playing a key role in instigating the military 
resistance movement and separate education system in the South that followed. 
 It is important to begin with Sudanese history prior to independence in 1956, as it 
was during this time that deep lines were drawn between Northern Arabs and Southern 
African tribes. In 1879, a British officer named Charles Gordon took over the Sudanese 
governorship in the employ of the Egyptians with goals of ending the slave trade. 
However, he was killed in 1885 by Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi, who sought to 
implement an Islamic state. He and his successor, Khalifa Abdallah succeeded in this 
endeavor and ruled Sudan for thirteen years, thus laying the foundations for the future 
Arabic-Muslim nationalism that was to later influence Northern Sudan’s Islamization. In 
1898, Lord Kitchener defeated Khalifa Abdallah, thus establishing a period of 
complicated colonialism known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. In short, prior to 
independence, Islamic groups promoted their ideology in the North, while British 
colonizers spread their Western, Christian influence in the South.   147
 During British colonialism in the South, education was “intentionally 
underdeveloped to maintain the perceived ‘purity’ of the Southern Sudanese and [to] 
simplify administrative responsibilities.”  Christian missionaries, who largely did the 148
instructing during this time, placed an emphasis solely on evangelization at the expense 
of a well-rounded education. Thus, education was not meant to teach children to read, 
write, or critically think and contribute to society, but to prepare the way to the Christian 
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religion and British culture. Indeed, the British government and Christian missionaries 
agreed that “a literary education was dangerous,” due to the threat of revolt or violent 
independent movements.  These trends led to extremely poor educational quality in the 149
South prior to independence, which would play a key role in formulating the South’s 
education system. More importantly, these trends also had an effect on creating a largely 
Christian South Sudan that was distinct in every way from the North. 
 The government of Khartoum at the time of independence in 1956 believed that 
establishing a Sudanese nationality along Islamic lines would create a sense of social 
unity based on a “superior civilization.”  Therefore, in 1957, President Ibrahim Abboud 150
nationalized all schools in Sudan, which led to the closure of numerous Christian 
missionary schools and African rural schools. Even now, Southern Sudanese see this 
action as the beginning of the Islamization that would slowly pervade all aspects of 
Sudanese life and politics.  South Sudan was left with a Muslim education that was 151
purposefully “inadequate,” due to a fear that an educated Southern population would be 
more likely to rise up against the nascent government in Khartoum.  These policies 152
culminated in 1990 when President Bashir pushed educational reform to revise the 
national curricula on solely Islamist values; therefore, new textbooks for all schools and 
universities were to be produced with the goal of phasing out all non-government schools 
and integrating all students into the new Islamic state-sponsored schools.   153
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 This curricula was created and assessed by the National Curriculum Center in 
Khartoum (NCCER), which was filled with government appointees who fell in line with 
the Sudanese government’s ideology.  Anders Breidlid interviewed a member of this 154
education board and asked about the wisdom of imposing an Islamic curriculum on a 
culturally-diverse country. The interviewee “insisted on the inherent unity between the 
South and the North and said that multiculturalism was taken care of and subsumed under 
the umbrella of Tawhid or the oneness of God: ‘Sudan is one country based on cultural 
and religious unity.’”  Thus, the NCCER refused to recognize the diversity present in 155
Sudan by creating a biased and intolerant curricula. 
 In general, the Islamic state that Northern Sudan was attempting to implement 
was seen as superior to all other states and ideologies, as “something stable, universal, 
unchangeable, and protected by firm principles of law and morality.”  Therefore, any 156
perspective that did not coincide with Islamic principles were discarded. This is why 
philosophy was largely absent from the education system since it gave too much weight 
to reason, rather than faith. Similarly, African tribal culture and epistemology were 
eliminated as they were seen as “inferior and uncivilized” and a threat to Islamic 
identity.  In sum, the Sudanese government believed in the importance of cultivating a 157
unified nation-state through education, even though Southerners and many in the 
international community recognized South Sudan as a distinct cultural and religious 
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entity.  But as Breidlid concludes, “The Islamists’ homogenizing efforts, however, often 158
had a negative effect: they created a fierce reaction which in many ways solidified and 
cemented identities along ethnic and cultural lines rather than creating one hegemonic 
identity.”  Therefore, a deep resentment was created in South Sudan that eventually 159
transformed schools from a “refuge from conflict” into a platform to “express 
resistance.”  Similar to the case in Kosovo, the Southern education system was seen as 160
an important form of identity formation along non-Arabic, non-Muslim lines.  161
 In response, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan 
“fiercely resisted the imposition of an Islamist ideology in the education system.” 
Because of this, the SPLM’s Ministry of Education introduced a secular, Western, 
modernist educational system in the South as a counter-movement to the Islamization 
efforts of the North. The goal of the new curricula was to be more “inclusive” and to 
build a cohesive, Southern Sudanese identity across ethnic divides, rather than focusing 
on individual tribal identities. However, even this had its flaws as it often homogenized a 
diverse tribal community along a narrow, Western framework, while devaluing 
indigenous values and culture.  Breidlid further notes that the development of SPLM-162
backed education system as a tool for the “resistance struggle,” as well as the West’s 
financial support of the Western discourse, made bridging the ideological gap between 
the North and the South all but impossible.  Indeed, such a reaction solidified identities 163
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along ethnic lines.  “For Southerners, Christianity is now both a religion and a political 164
weapon against Islamization and Arabization.”  Therefore, it can be said that both the 165
North and the South utilized homogenization to the detriment of peace and reconciliation. 
 The main strategy of the Northern-based Islamic curricula is to unify Sudan 
through Arabic language and history and Muslim religion and culture. In an interview, a 
Southern politician stated that Southern Sudanese students “suffer” because they are 
unable to pass the national examinations due to the fact that their Arabic is not good 
enough. Similarly, he stated, “Our children do not learn where they come from. They do 
not learn anything about our history, culture, and language.”  The Sudanese history 166
textbooks in particular purposefully exclude other viewpoints and discriminate against 
those who do not speak Arabic and do not identify with the Arabic-Muslim culture. The 
following example of a simple statement in a textbook before and after the period of 
Islamization shows how Islamization has pervaded all aspects of Sudanese life: prior to 
Islamization, this textbook stated, “Today I will go to school. Tomorrow I will go to the 
dentist. Friday I will go to the cinema.” However, this statement was replaced by: “Today 
I will pray five times. Tomorrow I will read in the Qur’an. Friday I will go to the 
Mosque.”  Along these same lines, each chapter in the math textbooks open with a 167
Qur’anic verse in order to further the idea that not only is Sudan a Muslim country, but to 
recognize Tawhid in that religion pervades all aspects of life.  Furthermore, all textbook 168
images portray men and women as Arabic with Arabic clothing and Arabic names, thus 
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furthering the illusion that Sudan is only Arabic-Muslim.  According to a UNESCO 169
report compiled by G.L. Arora, of the 59 textbooks developed by the NCCER for grades 
1 to 8, only three have been produced in English, with the rest being in the Arabic 
language, while “the mother tongue of the child is not taught at any stage of school 
education.”  Arora further notes that Arabic classes receive 22% of school time, while 170
20% of lessons are related to religion in some way since the the inclusion of religion as a 
compulsory area of curricular content falls in line with the goal of the national education 
policy to instill religious thinking in every aspect of life.  Therefore, through language 171
and images, South Sudanese students were discriminated against within the Sudanese 
education system. Besides the one-sidedness of the subject matter, Sudanese education in 
the North also left little room for a well-rounded, civic curricula apart from Islam. 
 The Arabic-Islamic overarching narrative was also furthered through history. In 
an equivalent of a social science course called “Things Around Us” for grades 1-4 and 
“Man and the Universe” for grades 5-8, Arab history is dominant without hardly a hint of 
tribal history and African ethnicities. One particular chapter is called “Man’s Advent to 
the Sudan,” and it begins with the coming of Arab Muslims to Sudan without even 
mentioning the fact that Christianity had been present in Sudan centuries prior. 
Conspicuously missing as well is the Arab slave trade in the interior of present-day South 
Sudan.  Thus, Sudanese identity through history focused on a Northern Arabic 172
perspective alone. In sum, after an analysis of 41 textbooks created by the NCCER, 
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Breidlid concludes that “the Arab-Muslim bias is overwhelming… South Sudanese 
history, religion, and culture are almost entirely left out.”  173
 On the other hand, it is equally important to examine aspects of the South 
Sudanese education system in order to present a full picture of the connection between 
education and the various conflicts that have affected Sudan. Indeed, after South Sudan’s 
independence in 2011, a further conflict erupted in 2013 within South Sudan, which has 
been fought along dissenting political and tribal lines. In this regard, Merethe Skaras and 
Breidlid performed a study on South Sudanese education post-independence by 
examining classroom teaching from 2014 to 2015 to see how South Sudanese schools 
teach their violent past. Skaras and Breidlid conclude that national unity is attempted by 
demonizing the Arab North, while smoothing over any ethnic tensions among the South 
Sudanese through lecture-based instruction with little room for discussion. In terms of 
demonizing the Arab North, one teacher stated to the class: 
That ill feelings or hatred or distrust is still existing. Even though we are 
now two separate countries. Even though we are now two separate 
countries, ok. That ill feelings, that hatred, that distrust is still existing, ok. 
Between the southerners and the northerners. Why? Because during the 
war the Arabs who were here in the south killed and mistreated the 
southerners, ok. So that was the reason why these ill feeling is still there 
existing today. Good.  174
Furthermore, another teacher was recorded as teaching the students: 
If you learn the way your people suffered and the question you should ask 
is always: who was responsible for that? Ok. Or who inflicted that 
suffering on our people. Definitely, the answer is the Arabs and it makes 
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you not to love the Arabs. Yeah. It makes you to look the Arabs as the 
immediate enemy, the first enemy of South Sudan, you know.  175
These feelings of resentment can be noticed first-hand in student essays that were 
examined within Skaras and Breidlid's study. In an essay written about the causes of the 
war, all of the 69 respondents state that “marginalization” and “exploitation” by the North 
were the key factors that led to the civil war, and the culprits were the “elites” of the 
North within the Khartoum government. Thus, feelings of resentment are reinforced, 
legitimized, and even carry over to the current conflict.  176
 In the current conflict, it appears that the South Sudanese curriculum attempts to 
avoid discussion of ethnicity in order to create a “unified past narrative and collective 
memory” as a form of national unity.  For example, in one classroom observation 177
performed by Skaras and Breidlid, when a student asked a question about the ethnic 
tensions in the South, the teacher gave a “superficial” answer to the question while 
completely avoiding ethnicity.  Skaras and Breidlid conclude that disproportionately 178
blaming the Northern Arabs, while discarding any notions of ethnic tensions in the South 
may be “counterproductive.”  By minimizing or completely avoiding the recent civil 179
war, the South Sudanese curriculum has resorted to historical inaccuracies, a lack of 
discussion and critical thinking, and removing the voice and perspective of those who 
have experienced loss.  This has played out most prominently in the Nilotic vs. non-180
Nilotic tribal divisions. In interviews with teachers and students, the Nilotic tribes are 
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“described as different people with different mentalities, not well civilized and totally 
behind in terms of development.”  Therefore, Skaras and Breidlid note that though 181
avoiding the topic may be “pedagogically sound,” not addressing the divisions only serve 
to reinforce the narrative circulating in the South that describes the Nilotic tribes as 
backwards and aggressive, thus furthering the ethnic divisions causing the current civil 
war.  In general, the South Sudanese curriculum fails to address the “structural causes 182
of conflict or the role of Southerners as active participants in the war,” while painting an 
exclusively negative stereotype of the Arab Northerners and sweeping any divisions 
among Southerners under the rug to the detriment of reconciliation and healing.  183
 In sum, education systems in Sudan certainly exacerbated conflict through a 
homogenization along Arabic-Muslim lines, as well as a lack of honesty in the South 
Sudanese curriculum. A policy of Islamization, though seeking to unify Sudan, in fact 
widened the differences between the North and the South, “escalating the conflict 
between them and giving it a racial and religious dimension that eventually reached 
genocidal proportions.”  Without a diversity of perspectives, Sudanese education 184
systems may continue to aggravate tensions along ethnic, tribal, and religious lines on 
both sides. The case of Sudan also highlights the fact that independence is not a panacea 
for ethnic conflict. Indeed, peace and coexistence must be predicated on a recognition of 
Sudanese diversity, and educational policy and curricular reform could be a necessary 
step towards achieving such goals.  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Chapter Five: A Contrasting Case Study — Canada 
 Canada is considered by many to be one of the most diverse among the Western 
nations, and it has had relatively little internal conflict in recent history. Thus, in light of 
the previous case studies examined, the question must be asked: How has Canada 
maintained peace with such diversity? And how has Canada utilized its education system 
to mobilize informed, global citizens who appreciate differences, rather than fearing 
them? In their study on ethnic diversity and multiculturalism in Canada’s current 
curricula, Carla Peck, Alan Sears, and Shane Donaldson state that “education has been 
one of the principle vehicles for accomplishing the paired goals of accommodating 
diversity while maintaining social cohesion.”  However, it is important to note that this 185
was not always the case. Prior to World War II, Canada’s policy was to bar immigrants 
who did not fit the “dominant White, British culture,” and to assimilate already-present 
non-White people groups into that culture as best as possible. A change occurred in 1947, 
however, with the Citizenship Act, which was key in shifting “Canadian Identity” 
towards multiculturalism, rather than assimilation.  These shifts in Canadian politics 186
eventually trickled down to the education system as well. Prior to this time, Canadian 
schools and curricula were designed to “homogenize a diverse population” built on “a 
common English language, a common culture, a common identification with the British 
Empire, and an acceptance of British institutions and practices.”  This changed 187
throughout 1965 to 1975, when a “tidal wave” of revisions in the educational systems 
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began to focus on accommodating ethnic differences.  Thus, Canada represents the 188
ideal contrasting case as it possesses similar features to the cases of Kosovo, Pakistan, 
and Sudan: ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity; questions of first occupation to a 
“homeland”; and a complicated, conflictual history. Despite these insurmountable topics 
— topics that Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan failed to address — Canada’s curricula excels 
in being honest, critical, and open-minded to the many distinct viewpoints represented 
within Canadian identity. This contrasting case study will examine the social studies 
subjects represented in the Ontario Curriculum due to the fact that Ontario represents one 
of the most diverse regions of Canada.  189
 Before delving into the curricular content, it must be noted that the Ontario 
curriculum promotes learning through a variety of methods, which it terms “disciplinary 
thinking,” which is important for students to come to their own conclusions. Mastering 
the skills of this type of thinking includes investigation, evaluating evidence, 
collaborative discussion, and the creation and use of appropriate materials, including 
technology and visuals such as maps and graphs.  Such an emphasis on diverse learning 190
methods puts a priority on critical thinking, rather than simple rote memorization or 
lectured-based instruction. Similarly, because of the collaborative nature of Canada’s 
learning process, students learn to consider and respect other’s perspectives.  In sum, 191
 Ibid, 68.188
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the simplified goal of the curricula’s social studies is to help Canadians recognize the 
advantage of their multicultural diversity and role as global citizens.  192
 The Ontario Curriculum for grades 1-6 Social Studies and grades 7-8 History and 
Geography were revised from the 2004 curriculum and went into effect on September 
2014.  The Ontario Curriculum for Grades 11-12 Canadian and World Studies were 193
revised from the 2005 curriculum and went into effect on September 2015.  All social 194
studies subjects share a common vision and goal, which is laid out as follows: “The social 
studies, history, geography, and Canadian world studies programs will enable students to 
become responsible, active citizens within the diverse communities to which they 
belong.”  Thus, as opposed to Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan where diversity was 195
sacrificed for the sake of unity, Canada recognizes diversity as the foundation upon which 
civic engagement and social cohesion can be built. This is reflected in its curricula as can 
be seen from the way it shapes Canadian identity, the way it deals with its difficult past, 
and the way it accommodates ethnic and linguistic differences. 
 First, Canadian identity is built on diversity and recognizing “the other.” In the 
opening paragraphs of the Ontario curriculum, it is stated that “students develop their 
understanding of where they came from by studying past societies, analyzing connections 
between the past and present, and exploring the contributions of past societies to 
Canadian heritage.”  Furthermore, the curriculum encourages teachers to select topics 196
and resources that reflect the diversity within the classroom as a way of recognizing the 
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“diversity and complexity of Canadian society.”  Therefore, rather than 197
homogenization, Canada’s classrooms celebrate diversity. For example, a lesson for grade 
2 includes the following: 
Identify some different groups in their community (e.g., various religious 
and ethnocultural groups), and describe some of the ways in which they 
contribute to diversity in Canada (e.g., different languages, foods, music, 
clothing, holidays; ethnic neighborhoods with specialized shops and 
restaurants).   198
From these discussion questions and learning outcomes, it can be seen that Canadian 
curricular content places a priority on understanding Canadian diversity from a plethora 
of platforms: religious, cultural, linguistic, etc. For grade 3, a similar lesson includes the 
following discussion topics as a means by which diversity is recognized through 
Canada’s multiethnic history: 
Describe some of the similarities and differences in various aspects of 
everyday life of selected groups living in Canada between 1780 and 1850 
(e.g., First Nations, Métis, French, British, Black people; men and women; 
slaves, indentured servants, habitants, seigneurs, farmers; people from 
different classes)… Identify some key components of the Canadian 
identity (e.g., bilingualism, multiculturalism, founding nations, religious 
freedom), and describe some of the ways in which communities that were 
in Canada around the early 1800s have had an impact on Canadian 
identity.  199
Similarly, in grade 6, a lesson encourages students to “evaluate some of the contributions 
that various ethnic and/or religious groups have made to Canadian identity.”  200
Finally, in grade 8, lessons in diversity and Canadian identity become more hands-on 
with students examining and investigating ethnic groups other than their own: 
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Gather and organize information and evidence about perspectives of 
different groups on some significant events, developments, and/or issues 
that affected Canada and/or Canadians during this period, using a variety 
of primary sources.  201
Through these activities, Ontario’s curriculum encourages students to not only appreciate 
Canada’s diversity, but to investigate the “how” and “why” behind Canada’s origins and 
ethnic makeup. It is also important to note that in Canada’s classrooms, the teacher is not 
simply lecturing students on diversity. Instead, students are encouraged to discuss, think 
critically, and utilize historical understandings and inquiry. 
 Diversity themes are furthered in grades 11 and 12 through the history curricula, 
whereby it is hoped that the lessons will “convey a sense of the dynamic nature of 
Canadian and world history. Students learn that the people of the world have many stories 
and that each one is significant and requires thoughtful consideration.”  In fact, a key 202
course within the the grade 11 social studies curricula is a project called “The History of 
a Canadian Ethnic Group,” whereby students work together to examine how diverse 
people groups comprise Canadian identity by “anyalyz[ing] the historical development of 
key social structures and trends,” “describ[ing] some ways in which social factors in their 
countries of origin influenced people’s decisions to emigrate,” and by “analyz[ing] 
challenges and opportunities associated with preserving cultural diversity in Canada.”  203
Therefore, as students progress through their social studies, they grow from a simple 
acknowledgement of Canada’s diversity towards a thoughtful consideration of the social 
structures that have influenced and created such diversity. 
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 The Ontario Curriculum (revised): Grades 11 and 12, Canadian and World Studies — Economics, Geography, 202
History, Law, Politics (The Ontario Public Service, 2015), 15.
 Ibid, 341, 348.203
!58
 Second, accommodation is made within the classroom to all types of people 
groups through not only including diverse cultural perspectives, but through a priority 
placed on helping those who have the added challenge of “language-learning.” In order to 
seek “fair, transparent, and equitable” assessment for all students, the Ontario curriculum 
provides support for those with special education needs and those who are not yet 
proficient in the language of instruction, which is either English or French, depending on 
the area. Such provisions are especially made for immigrants, as well as First Nation, 
Metis, or Inuit students.  Thus, “All teachers share in the responsibility for these 204
students’ English-language development,” as well as general development.  Such an 205
enormous task is not seen as arduous or a hindrance to learning, but rather such students 
are seen as a “cultural asset” for the “rich diversity of background knowledge and 
experience” that they bring to the classroom.  In fact, the Ontario curriculum 206
recommends for teachers to encourage parents of such children to continue in their first 
language and even to “find opportunities to bring students’ languages into the classroom, 
using parents and community members as a resource.”  Therefore, as opposed to 207
Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan, whereby thousands of students were discriminated against 
based on their language, Ontario instead encourages and celebrates linguistic diversity. 
 The most important aspect for such an inclusive education system is that “all 
students see themselves reflected in the curriculum.”  Indeed, the Ontario curriculum 208
calls for bringing attention to the contributions of women, the cultural traditions of the 
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First Nations, Metis, and Inuit, as well as the perspectives of various ethnic and religious 
communities throughout history.  Along these lines, injustices and inequalities are 209
critically examined. But as opposed to the Kosovo case, for example, that focused on 
victimization experienced within injustice, Canada’s curriculum looks at such tragedies 
from the perspective of how those who have faced injustices have “acted as agents of 
change and can serve as role models for active citizenship.”  For example: 210
Explain how various groups have contributed to the goal of inclusiveness 
in Canada (e.g., the efforts of women’s rights, civil rights, First Nations, or 
labour organizations, or of advocacy organizations for immigrants, 
disabled people, or various religious or ethnic groups), and assess the 
extent to which Canada has achieved the goal of being an inclusive 
society.  211
Thus, rather than focusing on “enemies,” “the other,” or identity formation within 
“victimization,” Canada encourages social justice as a primary responsibility of 
citizenship within Canada’s diverse communities. Furthermore, Canadians value honesty 
and sensitivity about the hardships that immigrants have faced in terms of relocating to a 
new country, culture, and language. Such is the case in a grade 11 activity: “Analyze 
some challenges that Canadian immigration policies have presented to some ethnic 
groups, with a particular focus, where applicable, on the selected ethnic group.”  212
 Third, as has been seen from the case studies examined in this thesis, ethnically-
diverse countries tend to whitewash their past by providing a smooth fabric of history, 
thus refusing a voice to the oppressed. Canada, on the other hand, is honest about its 
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historical wrongs. For example, consider a grade 7 activity on displacement: “Analyze 
the displacement experienced by various groups who were living in or who came to 
Canada between 1713 and 1800… and compare it with present-day examples of 
displacement.”  The purpose of such an activity is not to simply dredge up such 213
injustices, but to “think critically about global inequalities.”  Rather than rewriting 214
history in order to present a seamless, conflict-free Canadian origin mythology, as has 
been attempted in Pakistan or Sudan, the Ontario curriculum recognizes the injustices 
that Canada’s original inhabitants have suffered. In sum, through studying history and 
Canadian identity formation, as well as through its inclusive system that promotes 
diversity and accommodation for language-learners, Canada encourages citizenship and 
collaboration, rather than conflict or segregation. 
 In conclusion, Canada represents an even more culturally-diverse country than 
any of Kosovo, Pakistan, or Sudan, with an equally complicated history, though 
extremely low levels of conflict. Though this most likely is due to the stability of the 
country in general, the fact that the government took such great pains to invest in a 
multicultural education revision proves the importance that Canada places on continuing 
that stability through education. Canada reverses all of the trends seen in the case studies 
of Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sudan by celebrating diversity and heterogeneity as an 
important foundation for national unity and social cohesion; by being honest about its 
history; and by accommodating ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences.  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Chapter Six: Conclusions and Implications 
 The Hidden Crisis clarifies the education-civil conflict connection as follows: 
“Education is seldom, if ever, the primary motivation for armed conflict… Perhaps that is 
why the role of education in contributing to violent conflict has been so widely 
neglected.”  Indeed, in all cases examined in this thesis, education was clearly not an 215
afterthought in connection to civil conflict. In both Sudan and Kosovo, education was 
seen as a vital part of the resistance movements’ identity formation and political 
legitimacy, which is the reason why parallel education systems were formed early on. In 
Pakistan, the education system is much stronger and consolidated in the central 
government; yet still, the textbook controversy shows that educational representation was 
important to minorities and evoked a violent response. Therefore, education is vitally 
important for an understanding of causes of civil conflict. Nonetheless, the question must 
be asked: is education merely something that is fought over, or do educational institutions 
actually contribute to violence through the nationalistic messages that they propagate? 
Based on my research, I would argue that education does contribute towards the 
instigation or exacerbation of civil conflict through the homogenization of a heterogenous 
culture, as well as through the careful manipulation of language and images in textbooks. 
 Through a study of Kosovo, Pakistan, Sudan, and Canada, it becomes readily 
apparent that governments see value in homogenizing identity and language in order to 
create a sense of national unity and shared values. However, especially in the three 
negative cases, what was less understood at that time was how a system of assimilation 
 Watkins, The Hidden Crisis, 171.215
provoked a response of resistance and even violence from the out-group. Establishing a 
centralized language in a linguistically-diverse society naturally excludes minorities. In 
these cases, demonization of “the other” are created in the minds of the majority, while 
minorities experience discrimination, exclusion, and linguistic repression. Especially in 
the case of Sudan, students who were not fluent in the primary language could not 
partake of educational and, in effect, economic advantages that were afforded the 
majority. In this way, governments, especially through language, have furthered unequal 
educational access, thus indirectly sparking conflict. In all three cases of Kosovo, 
Pakistan, and Sudan, linguistic homogenization in the state-sponsored curricula sparked 
non-violent educational resistance movements that eventually transformed into full-
fledged military contestations. Similarly, homogenization of identity seeks to create a 
singular sense of nation that excludes minority viewpoints in order to falsely instill a 
shared sense of what it means to be Kosovar, Pakistani, or Sudanese. But rather than 
include diverse viewpoints, the educational systems of these countries smoothed over 
complex, divergent histories and relationships. In so doing, entire people groups and their 
culture were left out, thus necessitating resistance to save ethnic heritage. It is interesting 
to note that it is not always the students who feel such dispossession and lack of 
representation, but it is oftentimes the parents and other educational actors who respond 
for the sake of furthering their own culture and history in the coming generations. In sum, 
all three of the negative case studies show how homogenization in an education system 
for the sake of national unity more often than not creates the very opposite outcome that 
is hoped for. In the case of Canada, on the other hand, a policy of accommodation, rather 
!63
than assimilation, has created an accepting environment for all languages, identities, and 
experiences. 
 By way of more specific examples of how identity matters, all of the case studies 
examined highlight the importance of history and homeland to education systems. Much 
research has been done on the topic of history as formative for a national or ethnic 
identity. History not only informs people who they are and where they come from, but 
where they are going as well. Thus, when such a crucial aspect of identity formation is 
taken away or covered up, feelings of repression must follow. History can equally evoke 
feelings of pride, as well as victimization, in creating a sense of self. In the case of 
Kosovo specifically, Serbs and Albanians have learned through their own histories to hate 
one another for historical wrongs. In Pakistan, history is utilized to instill hatred for their 
enemy, the Hindus; while in Sudan, a different approach is taken whereby the centralized 
government smooths over conflict in the country in order to falsify a seamless, conflict-
free history. In Canada, on the other hand, history not only includes many facets and 
perspectives, but teachers are not afraid to discuss openly the low-points of Canada’s own 
history in a critical way. Thus, it becomes obvious that the way educational institutions 
handle history is crucial for instilling a sense of identity, as well as a correct view of “the 
other.” Identity is further connected to the homeland, since as has been noted, geography, 
space, and boundaries create a physical representation of what it means to be Kosovar, 
Pakistani, or Sudanese. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the civil conflict of 
Kosovo. As Kostovicova notes, in times of conflict, education not only becomes about 
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reading and writing, but about an understanding of the “fatherland.”  Thus, feelings of 216
dispossession are evoked when the homeland is infringed upon through historical and 
geographical manipulation of textbooks. 
 In conclusion, it is apparent from these case studies that there is a connection 
between education and civil conflict, both in terms of access, as well as content. 
However, not enough evidence exists to state whether or not educational content 
represents a primary instigator of civil conflict. Nonetheless, it can be said that curricular 
content has been utilized by warring parties to exacerbate already-present ethnic or 
religious divisions. In this way, governments and resistance movements have utilized 
education to form competing national identities that instill a sense of hatred towards “the 
other.” Such identity formation is vitally important towards the provocation of civil 
conflict, and there is arguably no better medium by which such a large-scale message can 
be spread en masse than through education. However, it is impossible to say with any 
certainty, for example, whether or not the Kosovar conflict would have reached its 
horrifying climax with or without the impact of education. Are civil conflicts established 
merely through political or economic reasons, or could social factors such as education 
play a vital role as well? While there are greater aspects that need to be addressed in order 
to deal with the root cause of civil conflict, educational factors must be included in any 
analyses of civil conflict in order to not only deal with the ethnic or religious tensions 
present within a country, but in order to reshape a people’s thinking and policies for the 
future.  
 Kostovicova, Kosovo, 20216
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